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TESTO
COMPLETO
What
inspires trust in specific instances varies considerably. Tyler
and Kramer (1996),
as well as Moellering
(2005) and Lewicki
et al. (2006: 1007), define
three, largely similar, transactional frameworks, applicable to
most Western or Westernized cultures. These normally
determine three different intensity levels of "trust".
The
following paragraphs are a synthesis of both series of frameworks
and a reworking of
the explanations given for the corresponding levels
of “trust”.
--
Framework 1. One-off business or interpersonal
transactions.
Note:
The term “one-off” usually means there is only one
encounter, but
it can also indicate
a
series of encounters conceived from the beginning as short-lived
and circumscribed.
Within
this Framework, as in Gambetta's definition (Scheda 1),
"trust" is no more than willingness to run a calculated
risk. That willingness is proportionately inverse to the
risk of vulnerability: if the risk is more than 50%, then trust
is less than 50% – which means there is no trust, only a
bettor's hope on a long shot. Thus, in this Framework, "I
trust you" simply means: "I have investigated you as
much as possible; I have bound you contractually as much as the
law permits and you agree to; I have taken out insurance that
will reimburse me at least partially in case you default; as for
the remaining uncertainty regarding your future behavior and the
consequent risk, I accept both as I do all the other business
costs involved in this deal, i. e. as part of the game."
We
will take this low-intensity trust as our starting point and give
it a name: "Trust as the (reluctant) acceptance of a
calculated risk" (Level 1).
It is usually
associated with Framework 1 (one-off transactions) but not
always. In fact, on occasion, even long-term
business and interpersonal transactions (Framework 2 – see
ahead) may be conducted, year after year, at this level. In
couples this happens, for example, if one or both parties suffer
from such syndromes as affective poverty, chronic (dysfunctional)
distrust, pathological jealousy, etc. There may also be
objective reasons: the other party may effectively give proof of
occasional incompetence, malevolence, or lack of commitment.
--
Framework 2. Long-term business or interpersonal transactions.
In
this Framework "trust" is created by sustained positive
reinforcement, i.e. by repeated experiences of trustworthiness in
dealing with the other party (or parties taken to be similar)
that seemingly will continue that way into the future.
Castelfranchi & Falcone's definition of “trust”
(Scheda 1), as glossed, holds here. In fact,
constant positive reinforcement reduces or even eliminates
anxiety over how the other party will act. In this
Framework, therefore, "I trust you" means: "You
have accustomed me, by way of the repeated confirmations you have
given me over time, to consider you dependable, and so I will
rely on you this time, too, without a second thought and without
attempting to exercise any control over your behavior.
However, should you betray my trust, we shall revert to Framework
1."
Trust
like this produces immediate dividends in reduced costs per
interaction. In business transactions, for example, there
is little or no investigation to conduct, minimal or no insurance
premiums to pay, and at times a gentleman's agreement replaces a
contract (thus saving lawyers' fees). The relationship is also
more productive and the parties manage to come up with negotiated
solutions more easily.
This
level of trust, which will will call "Trust as an
acquired disposition for low-anxiety delegation" (Level 2),
is the prevalent one today in both the business world and
interpersonal relations. You manifest it, however
unthinkingly, every time you take a pill or accept a cheque.
N. B. Note that Level 2 trust
differs from the concept of “reliance”. You
have reliance on things that appear certain: for example, you
rely on (not trust) gravity to bring down the coin that you toss
up into the air.
Trust,
on the other hand, implies awareness of possible risk (although
not
preoccupation, if trust is at Level 2). For example, every
time you take a newly prescribed pill you are aware that doctors
can make mistakes and that the pill could make you
worse; nonetheless you accept to take it – whether
tranquilly (if you trust your doctor at Level 2) or with some
wariness (if you trust him only at Level 1). In neither
case do you take the pill with reliance; that will come
only with time, when you feel certain about the pill's beneficial
effects. (See chapter 2 of Solomon & Flores, 2003, for
a similar distinction.)
Level 2 trust, therefore, differs
from Level 3 trust (see ahead) in that the former is a state of
“routine confidence”, while the latter, as we shall
see, is a state of “assured reliance” and is
therefore much more intense.
One last observation
about the expression “assured reliance” that we just
used. While stronger than Level 2 confidence, Level 3
“assured reliance” is nonetheless weaker than
ordinary, unqualified reliance – the kind of reliance we
have, for example, on gravity. In fact, we speak of our
“reliance on gravity” (not our “assured
reliance on gravity”) to bring a tossed coin down, because
we take gravity to be a certitude and do not need to affirm our
assurance that it will produce its effects.
But as
for how much we can rely on human beings, most of us have
no certitudes, only convictions, and therefore must specify
whether our convictions are strong enough to give us “assured
reliance”, or just a “fair degree of reliance”,
or whatever.
To conclude this
discussion of Level 2 trust, it should be noted that, while it is
normally associated with Transactional Framework 2, on occasion
it can be conceded in Framework 1 transactions. One example
is that of the down-and-out vagabond who tells his hard luck
story to a perfect stranger met on the street, pitching it at
Trust Level 2 by going into the kind of intimate details that one
normally tells to long-time friends only. If the ploy
works, the vagabond may manage to inspire Trust Level 2
“instantly” in the passer-by who, by reciprocity, may
recount similar events from his own personal life or even invite
the vagabond home for a meal.
--
Framework 3. Transactions within a relationship of (supposedly
life-long) reciprocal total commitment
First
let us consider interpersonal transactions of this
kind.
Within Framework 3, "trust" is created by
the parties through "suspending" (Moellering, 2005:17,
31) their mutual fear of dependence and risk. They typically
manage to do so by experiencing (or fantasizing) a profound
knowledge of -- through empathetic identification with -- the
other party. Indeed, their knowledge of the other party
seems to them to be “perfect”. People in love,
deep friends, blood brothers, even hero worshipers all feel that
they have known the other party in their relationship for their
entire lives and are, to use Augustine's expression, "one
soul in two bodies." In this case, “I trust
you” literally means “as I would myself.”
However,
since knowledge is never perfect, the impression of “perfect
knowledge” can in fact be no more than a “belief”
that one knows the other party perfectly to
all appearances – a belief that is both
deep-rooted and stable.
N.B. In fact,
according to our first definition in Scheda 1, trust is a
state of “assured reliance” deriving from a “firm
belief”. In other words, it is one's “firm
belief” in the Other – however dependent on
appearances that belief may be – that makes reliance appear
“assured” and thus psychologically tenable.
Simmel (2004 [1900]:179, 480), too, speaks of
“socio-psychological quasi-religious faith” and “the
most considerable degree of belief” behind this kind of
trust.
Beliefs
are, by definition, fundamentally irrational, for if they were
held by rational demonstration they would not be beliefs.
They can, of course, be reasonable (founded on evidence), just as
they can be factitious (purely self-induced). But in either
case they are, to use Kierkegaard's expression, a “leap”
in the dark.
This third and most intense kind of trust,
being founded on a belief, is therefore a “leap”.
This means that it is never completely determined by the
“appearance of reliability” given by the other
party. It is, in fact, a complex act of the will that,
being volitive and not cognitive in nature, cannot be determined
by any cognitive construction in the mind, however compelling
(Simmel 2004 [1900]:400 et seq.). Put more simply, the
decision to trust, being essentially an act of free will, is
never simply the product of a line of reasoning and no amount of
rational arguments can determine it or dispel it. Indeed,
it requires three interdependent acts of will:
identification, belief and acceptance.
In practice,
(1.) once a subject has chosen
to identify herself with what she sees in the other party, and
(2.) once she has chosen
to believe that somehow she has then come to know that party
“perfectly”, and (3.) once she has chosen
to accept the vulnerability of relying on him to the extent she
thinks she knows him – which means totally, just as she
relies on herself, for now they are “one soul in two
bodies” –, then trust is born: a trust that goes far
beyond the other two kinds.
We will call this high
intensity (but nonetheless reasonable) confidence "Trust
as assured reliance on others, through identification-induced
'perfect' knowledge" (Level 3). One finds it not
only in truly enriching marriages and friendships, but also in
any form of ideal-driven association based on (supposedly
lifelong) total commitment, from religious orders to hippy
communes or other forms of “intentional
communities”. Total dedication to a
common ideology – as well as to the commonweal –
produces, along with synergy, the feeling of "perfect"
reciprocal knowledge and tolerance – and thus absolute
trust in one another. Even neighborhood street gangs can be
seen, in this respect, as positive examples of Level 3 trust.
The intense reciprocal confidence that they instill in otherwise
isolated individuals – who are the real danger in this age
of spree killings by loners – enable the latter to abandon,
albeit partially, their anti-social stance; this may enable them,
with time, to bestow at least Level 2 trust on outsiders and
perhaps
on day even on social institutions.
N.B.
Lewicki et al. (2006: 1016), while recognizing the value of this
high intensity trust, suggest combing it, on principle, with a
“healthy dose” of distrust, which serves as a
constant monitor or reality check. This combination of
opposites is not contradictory, they claim: a pinch of
distrust keeps a relationship on its toes, just as a pinch of
conflict makes a work group more dynamic – too much harmony
stultifies. While easy to judge cynical, this advice is, in
fact, what most people effectively put into practice in their
everyday lives.
All this means that our present
description of Level 3 trust, focused on its “pure”
or maximum expression, is admittedly an idealization.
Let us quickly add, however, that this high intensity trust –
precisely in its maximum, idealized form as described here –
is regularly put into practice by tough New York street gangs and
not just by pious, do-good, Himalayan religious orders; by
hard-nosed Japanese “family-like” corporations and
not just by visionary Venezuelan workers' cooperatives; by most
couples everywhere on their marriage day and by a significant
number years after. In other words, it is no pipe dream.
That being said, Level 3 trust in its pure form remains, without
a doubt, an ideal. In run-of-the-mill Framework 3
relationships, identification with the Other is seldom complete,
knowledge is seldom even apparently perfect, commitment is seldom
total, and acceptance of vulnerability (trust) is therefore
seldom without vigilance (which Lewicki et al. choose to call
distrust).
The
benefits of Level 3 trust, whether total or partial, go far
beyond those of Level 2 trust: transaction costs are zeroed,
creative interaction is enormously facilitated, and,
during the inevitable occasional differences in the relationship,
truly win-win solutions can be more easily found – not
because of reciprocal benevolence, but because of reciprocal
identification-induced (empathetic) knowledge. In fact,
such knowledge facilitates guessing the other party's real needs
(perhaps unconscious to him or her) and putting them on the
table, thus eliminating the superficial claims in conflict with
one's own real needs.
In addition, Level 3 trust
produces in both parties a total acceptance of each other for
better and for worse -- just as one accepts oneself totally, with
all one's limits. This makes "unpleasant surprises"
theoretically impossible. For even if the other party
occasionally fails in some respect, such behavior -- being
foreseen, understood, and accepted as part of the relationship,
i. e., as part of oneself -- tends to produce anger but not
rupture. Trust survives.
N.B.
LEVEL 2 & 3 ANOMALIES:
FAILED TRUST, BLIND TRUST, NAÏVE
TRUST, NEUROTIC TRUST
Obviously failures that
are unforeseen
and/or not
understood can destroy the illusion of "perfect knowledge"
and cause the damaged party to revert to Trust Level 2 or even
1. Note that this can happen even while maintaining
Transactional Framework 3, as in a marriage crisis due to some
disloyalty (e.g., infidelity, financial deceit,
double-dealing...). In fact, however bad things are, the
damaged partner may be reluctant, at first, to change her/his
(shared) computer or bank account passwords or the couple's
forthcoming vacation plans together, to give but two examples.
This state of failed trust – a low Trust Level
within a continuing high-level Transactional Framework –
can disorientate considerably, until the Framework is downgraded
to 2 or 1 (separate accounts, separate vacations, separate
bedrooms...) or faith is restored. The latter occurs if the
damaged party manages to renew her/his identification with
her/his partner, whose identity now includes the recently
discovered facts. This creates a new state of (apparently
perfect) knowledge of the partner's character. “Apparently”
means “Still open to renegotiation as new circumstances
reveal new aspects, although within
reasonable (foreseeable) limits”.
The
opposite reaction may be found in subjects who identify totally
with the Other and whose psychological equilibrium depends on
that communion. If there are failures that are unforeseen
and/or not
understood, these subjects will tend to rationalize them.
(Just asking “Why?” is an attempt at rationalization,
for it presupposes a conceivable response.) The subjects
may even attempt to deny the failures as such. But in
either case they accept them – at least until a death blow
is struck. This adamant decision to entrust oneself to the
Other, come what may, is commonly called
“blind trust” and counts such adepts as the biblical
character Job, who represents ill repaid yet steadfast trust in
one's god; the operatic protagonist Gilda in Rigoletto,
who represents apparently ill repaid yet steadfast trust in the
love of one's life; shunned artists like Van Gogh, who represent
ill repaid yet steadfast trust in their Muse (and in their future
public), etc.
Oddly enough, although it is the very
stuff of many fictional and real-life paragons, blind trust
– which we define here as an unrestrained, purely
irrational form of Level 3 trust deriving from total
identification – is deemed foolhardy by most people and
discouraged in one's interpersonal relations, professional life,
political involvement, and so on. Psychologists frown on it
as well; they point out how normal Level 3 trust permits one to
be totally committed, too, but safely within the limits
set by reason. Nonetheless, society, as a whole, continues
to encourage the blind trust of soldiers in their commanders,
whatever war they launch, and of people in general in their
institutions (e.g., the Presidency in America, the Papacy in
Catholicism, the Market in neo-liberal economics, etc.), whatever
failures these institutions have produced in the past. This
strangely contradictory situation is worth a study in
itself.
Solomon and Flores (2003) claim small children
exhibit “blind trust” – but certainly not in
the sense used here, since their capacity for Level 3 empathetic
identification is still scant. A small child's naïve
trust is simply Level 2 Trust (routinely bestowed trust)
conceded on the basis of too little experience to be really
justified. Unfortunately small children have no other
choice but to trust this way... and accept the hard knocks when
they arrive. For they lack the rational abilities for Level
1 trust or the intersubjective abilities for Level 3 trust, and
the only other alternative – no trust – would confine
them perpetually to their beds.
As children approach
adolescence, they become capable of the mature blind trust we
described above, by using their newly acquired intersubjective
capacities to understand who or what it is they wish to involve
themselves totally in. Unfortunately, pressed by their
inner needs, adolescents (as well as adults) can also fail
to use those capacities and fall prey to some form of neurotic
trust, the most common being narcissistic trust. This
variety, not to be confused with mature blind trust, gratifies
the subject by compensating for a severe (usually childhood)
wound to his or her sense of worth. Like the other neurotic
forms of trust, it is unilateral i.e. not co-constructed
through engagement with reality (technically, with the reality of
others) as any mature form of trust is. Subjects impose
on a chosen Other – for example, on an unloving or unstable
parent or on an equally inappropriate substitute figure –
their otherwise legitimate need to trust, expect the Other
to comply and then despair when the Other does not. Madame
Butterfly is the classic example.
Note
however that some
critics do not accept the
common interpretation of Madame
Butterfly: that of a headstrong
16-year-old with a narcissistic wound due to childhood abandon,
for which she tragically seeks compensation by believing in an
untrustworthy person like Pinkerton – in other words, an
adolescent with a very common neurosis who makes a very common
mistake because of it. Instead, they see in her a heroine
who lucidly channeled her wounded narcissism into an attack on an
unjust (sexist, feudal) social order, by deliberately
trusting Pinkerton beyond what circumstances allowed – and
this, according to the critics, makes her a visionary who paved
the way for women's emancipation.
In
any case, the three other major forms of neurotic Level 3
trust are unequivocally pathological. For example,
taking the “leap” of trust masochistically
(wanting to suffer), by trusting an Other with whom one does not
identify positively,
and who attracts precisely because s/he is incompatible,
malevolent, unpredictable, etc. Or taking the “leap”
manically (omnipotently), imagining against all odds to be
able to change the other party, with whom one does not
identify positively, into someone finally worthy of trust, by
bestowing one's complete trust on him or on her. Or taking
the “leap” compulsively (as gambling addicts
do), always sure that the next time one's trust will be
finally rewarded and, all the while, never really
understanding one's Others – or oneself, to begin
with.
One last observation. Non-neurotic,
mature blind trust is, in a sense, the only truly authentic form
of trust: For it is a “leap” in the dark with
no attempt at mitigation – a Promethean (or quixotic, if
one judges it negatively) rebellion against the empire of reason
and prudence.
Trust Levels 1, 2 and 3 are, on the other
hand, to some extent cheats. Level 3 trust is, in effect, a
form of certitude, not trust; for the impression of “perfect
knowledge” of the other party, however much one realizes
that it is only an appearance awaiting future renegotiation,
seems to guarantee (more or less) the outcome in advance: thus,
there is no great “leap” to make. Level 2 trust
is, in a sense, merely an abdication: one delegates unthinkingly,
out of habit; thus no great “leap” is necessary
either. Level 1 trust obviously requires no great “leap”:
it is a cold calculation.
Of course, in
practice, a minimal “leap” always takes place, since
one's belief or abdication or calculation are never sufficient by
themselves to compel one to accept a state of vulnerability.
One still has to opt for it (take a “leap”) and, in
deciding to do so, one is always, to some extent, in the dark.
Nonetheless, trust Levels 1, 2, and 3 are best described as
compromises between “entrusting oneself” and attempts
to reduce and/or mask the risk of doing so. In the same
way, we may add to be complete, the neurotic forms of Level 3
trust described above – half conscious choice, half
unconscious drive – are mongrels just as well, and cannot
be considered “trust” in its purest state.
Thus
the only truly authentic forms of trust that humans seem to
practice, remain those of level-headed gamblers, shunned artists,
path-breaking visionaries, and modern-day Jobs and Gildas.
Now
let us consider organizational (in particular,
business)
transactions.
Level 3 trust is studied only occasionally
in organizational contexts (Lewicki
et al. [2006], for example, discuss it under the name of
“intentional trust”). This is a curious
shortcoming.
For transactions in the workplace at Trust
Level 3 within Framework 3 are not only a possibility, they are a
fact. A strong shared identity together with intense bonds
of trust among all parties may be found among management and
staff in the major “family-like” corporations in
Japan practicing lifelong employment and automatic promotions
(most
still do), in the growing
number of agricultural co-operatives worldwide (see the ICAO),
and in the new factories and service industries owned and run by
worker
cooperatives in Venezuela
under Chavez.
Even ordinary company managers, especially
in knowledge-based industries, can (and in fact often do) attempt
to instill in their workforce Level 3 trust by creating, as much
as feasible, Transactional Framework 3. Since Level 3 trust
is quite literally "inspired" (ispirare in Latin
originally referred to the supernatural infusion of beliefs into
people) through the processes of identification and reciprocal
commitment, these managers attempt, compatibly with their
personalities, to be... inspiring (charismatic) and to promote:
a
common vision (as well as stock options),
a
company "spirit" (as well as social activities) and,
above all,
maximum
transparency (as well as in-house communication).
Initiatives
like these serve to create, among the staff, the feeling of
(identification-induced) “perfect knowledge” of the
management, as well as a feeling that all parties share, to some
degree, reciprocal commitment. As for the “totality”
and the “supposedly lifelong duration” of that
commitment, both of which are clearly lacking in a traditional
company structure, managers attempt to compensate by positioning
work within the company as a phase of an employee's overall
career planning and development, inside and outside the company.
This means, says the Indian HR consultancy Alagse:
providing,
when hiring and periodically thereafter, personalized
(career oriented) information on the direction the business is
heading in;
setting
career expectations and then encouraging career initiatives on
the part of individuals within the company through focused
retraining;
practicing
mentoring at all levels as a personalized form of interest in
career development, within the company and elsewhere;
in
a word, shifting the focus from creating lifelong employment to
creating “lifelong employability” (Bagshaw, 1997)
and, what makes the difference, assuming the responsibility
to make it happen for each individual worker.
Through
measures like these, an organization's image becomes more
trust-inspiring at Level 3. The organization seems to say
to each employee: “We do
care about your lifelong prospects. And so, while with us,
take ours to heart, too.” The key word is
“heart”.
Managing to inspire Level 3
trust pays off in higher revenue and profits due to increased
“job performance” (Lewicki et al., 2006: 992).
The causes of this increase lie in improved relationships (more
productive, more creative), in more easily negotiated win-win
solutions when conflicts arise and, most importantly, in a huge
jump in knowledge production and distribution within the
organization. People who interact at Trust Level 3 share
much more and sharing produces synergy (Argote & Ingram,
2000). Solomon & Flores (2003) emphasize how Level 3
trust “transforms” a workforce: people who trust and
feel trusted behave differently than people who do not; they take
more initiatives and come up with more ideas. In our
knowledge society, these benefits all go to make up a compelling
competitive advantage.
Unfortunately, the
goal of developing, within a business organization, genuine Level
3 trust through the full implementation of Transactional
Framework 3 (such as in the three examples given initially), has
become increasingly difficult today, given the organizational
dictates of neo-liberalism. These call for severing (not
reinforcing) bonds with employees, through outsourcing, staff
leasing, short-term contracts, etc. In practice,
neo-liberalism calls for:
eliminating
all vestiges of Transactional Framework 3 – thus, the IMF
has demanded that former Communist countries privatize all their
State industries, even in those sectors which are publicly owned
in many Western countries, and several Japanese
“family-like” corporations
have begun to substitute their policy of lifelong employment
(assunzioni per la vita) with Transactional Framework 2
(assunzioni a tempo indeterminato);
downgrading,
wherever possible,Transactional Framework 2 to Transactional
Framework 1 (assunzioni a temine, staff leasing, etc.).
These
changes have had a significant effect on Trust Levels.
Tyler and Kramer (1996: 3) express the problem in the United
States in the following terms:
"American
society is moving away from supporting long-term social
connections between individuals and between individuals and
organizations. In the family arena, the emergence of no-fault
divorce [i. e., recent legislation which authorizes divorces
simply upon demand, thus without attribution of fault, damages or
alimony] discourages long-term interpersonal commitments. In
work, the development of the "contingent workforce" [e.
g., widespread use of short-term contractuals] discourages
loyalty to work organizations. In this evolving world, people
increasingly cannot count on loyalty to others as a basis for
reciprocity. They cannot trust others. A wife, for example,
cannot point out to her husband that she abandoned her career to
raise their family and expect to invoke an obligation that will
be honored, just as workers cannot loyally support their
organization over the years and expect that organization to place
a high priority on their pension needs. [... Such] declining
trust in the existence of long-term exchange relationships
increases transaction costs, because people must engage in
self-protective actions and be continually making provisions for
the possibility of opportunistic behavior by [the other
party...]. This change in behavior reflects declines in the
stability of social networks and an increase in the number of
one-shot interactions [...in which] the decision to trust is
predicated primarily on the computation of risks."
Conclusion
People
“need to trust and to be trusted,”
observe Anderson & Elloumi (2004:220; emphasis
added). An organization that ignores this need, stunts its
workforce and its growth capabilities.
We have seen how
Trust Levels, normally associated with a particular Transactional
Framework, can be made to function within other Frameworks.
This means that the possibility should exist of developing the
intense kind of trust we have called “Level 3” even
within Transactional Framework 1 – i.e., even within
relationships that, by their nature, are neither
identification-based, nor total, nor lifelong. Indeed, this
is exactly what seducers, door-to-door salesmen and gurus try to
do: they attempt to use their charisma to create the illusion of
immediate identification, total involvement and timelessness (the
present is made to seem like a lifetime), in order to inspire
“instant” trust in one-off or limited-term
transactions.
It remains to be seen, however, by
what means this feat can be accomplished in large organizations.
Tyler and Kramer point out how today's workforce is increasingly
transient and fragmented, with little collective consciousness.
This would seem to make it simple for organizations to seek to
take the easy way out and
use
sops and purely cosmetic ploys to satisfy their employees' need
for reciprocal identification and reciprocal
commitment or, at the most,
develop,
within Transactional Framework 1, Level 2 (not 3) forms
of trust calculating that, for short-term workers, any
extra trust bestowed or rewarded will be seen as an unexpected
bonus anyway.
These
solutions can only be detrimental in the long run. The
first reason was given above: by stunting its workforce, a
company stunts its growth – Level 3 trust is a multiplier
of employee capabilities that cannot go unused. The second
reason regards labor relations: however splintered they are,
transitory workers today – by their sheer numbers –
make support-group networking inevitable, exposure of “sops”
and “ploys” instantaneous, and backlash effects
likely – just the opposite of what was sought in the first
place by “promoting” trust. Today's workforce,
increasingly sophisticated, requires more than PR.
Future
research therefore needs to address the issue of trust in our
neo-liberal world at its roots. Two obvious areas of
investigation are:
1. determining how Trust Level 3
manages to thrive spontaneously in many naturally-formed,
multicultural, transient communities and reinterpreting the
mechanisms discovered in function of neo-liberal organizational
structure;
while, at the same time,
2.
determining how Transaction Framework 3 can be implemented –
as is – in companies today, by changing their neo-liberal
organizational structure.
<<<>>>
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